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The growing presence of the far right in both internet and physical spaces 
is of concern because of the associated violence and civil unrest. The presence 
of the far right on the internet is historical and persistent. It is used by the far right 
movement to engage, radicalize, fellowship, plan and execute events, some of 
which are violent. This thesis explores the ways in which the far right uses online 
spaces and offline spaces in tandem, and how the use of imagery facilitates this 
process. To do this a visual and audio analysis was conducted on 100 videos 
posted to the social media site Parler on January 6, 2021. The videos were 
analyzed for far right related imagery and songs, chants, and narration to help 
shed light on how cyberspace and real life space not only worked in tandem, but 
in this event, became one and the same. The analysis found that while certain 
high profile far right groups kept their imagery visibility low, America First had a 
visible presence and they engaged in rhetoric decrying globalization and 
immigrants, which is of concern as it is the unifying theme nurturing growing 
global ties among the far right. The results also demonstrated the tension 
between pro law enforcement and antigovernment far right groups as well as the 
far rights weaponization of patriotic symbols.  
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January 6, 2021, was a cold day in Washington, D.C. The weather 
hovered in the low 40s Fahrenheit, but the temperature of the crowd at the “Save 
America” rally was heating up. President Trump implored the crowd, “if you don’t 
fight like hell, we won’t get our country back” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 24). 
Before the former President was done speaking, parts of the crowd had made 
their way down Pennsylvania Avenue and were already pushing at the gates of 
the US Capitol building. Some of these individuals were members of far right 
organizations that had planned and were now carrying out an attack on the 
Capitol. Inside the building, the members of the United States Congress, along 
with Vice President Mike Pence, were in the process of certifying the election 
results. The process continued until the crowd breached the building.  
This event lasted just over four hours, but its historical significance cannot 
be measured, at least not yet. It has been called a breach, a riot, a siege, an 
insurrection, and a coup d’état. Regardless of label, it was both planned and 
executed using the internet. It was also live streamed and uploaded to the 
internet in real time. Video after video of the day shows people with phones out. 
It is known that far right actors and groups took part in the events at the Capitol 
on January 6, 2021. The far right has used the internet since the early 1980s. 




The progression of the far right’s persistent presence and its ability to harness 
the internet to further its agenda represents a danger to civil society.  
This paper begins by defining the far right and outlining how and why the 
far right is considered extremist. It then investigates the history and current state 
of the far right’s presence on the internet, followed by theoretical frameworks 
from the field of social science to help in understanding the far right. A visual and 
audio analysis of the events of January 6, 2021, at the United States Capitol is 
undertaken and results show that cyber and physical spaces merged into one 
space on that day and imagery was prevalent in those spaces, serving as a 
source of solidarity and purpose for the participants.  
The following sections of chapter one cover the research problem and 
hypothesis, the type of research, and definitions. The definitions section covers 
the far right, extremism, internet presence, and imagery. These sections contain 
historical information where appropriate to both provide context and reflect the 
Master’s program of study.  
 
Research Problem and Hypothesis 
This thesis explores how the far right uses cyber and real life spaces in 
tandem and how imagery facilitates this process. This question arose after 
witnessing various flags being flown, taken down and then re-flown around the 
rural areas of the High Desert of Southern California during the run up to the 
November 2020 election. The High Desert is known to be conservative leaning 




with a lot of support for former President Trump and it is also known to have 
individuals who are part of the far right movement. The observations of the flags 
spurred further questions: why were the flags going up and down, was there 
some type of message being sent, and where would discussion of this occur? 
This led to research on the far right, especially concerning their use of internet 
spaces in conjunction with real life events, and how imagery facilitates this 
process. This research led to a hypothesis that the internet was integral to the 
events of January 6, 2021, at the U.S. Capitol and that imagery was a major 
factor in creating solidarity and purpose among the participants.  
 
Type of Research 
Research was conducted to explore this question, including the reading of 
several books, scholarly articles, and journalism articles. First it was important to 
understand the history of the far right, especially their online presence. Research 
into far right imagery and the mediums on which they predominantly appear was 
also conducted. To reflect the Master’s program of study completed concurrently 
to writing this thesis, an interdisciplinary approach from the lens of social science, 
using theories of anthropology, geography, sociology, and political science, was 
taken, while historical background was provided where appropriate. In addition, 
the growing global nature of the far right was also explored to reflect the Master’s 
course of study.  
 




Defining the Far Right 
 Professor and director of the Polarization and Extremism Research and 
Innovation Lab (PERIL) at American University, Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2020) offers 
a comprehensive definition of the far right. Miller-Idriss’s (2020) research of the 
far right includes field work done in both the United States and Germany. She 
places the far right into “four separate but overlapping categories: 
antigovernment and antidemocratic practices and ideals, exclusionary beliefs, 
existential threats and conspiracies, and apocalyptic fantasies’’ (Miller-Idriss, 
2020, p. 4). The practices and ideals of the antigovernment and antidemocratic 
portion of the far right seek to undermine democratic ideals around the globe. 
Miller-Idriss (2020) cites “disinformation campaigns, election interference, attacks 
on the freedom of the press, violating the constitutional protection of minority 
rights, or using violence and terrorism to achieve political goals” as actions taken 
by these groups, who often form into paramilitary groups and militias in the 
United States and in Europe form third parties who put forth candidates for office, 
sometimes being successful. Miller-Idriss (2020) notes that in the United States 
the lack of influential third parties resulted in far right candidates running as 
Republicans and attempting to sway the party from within (p. 5). This can be 
seen in their adoption of some of the far right’s talking points and specifically their 
use of exclusionary and dehumanizing language.  
This language reflects the far right category of exclusionary beliefs. The 
belief system of the far right is hierarchical and includes “racist, anti-immigrant, 




nativist, nationalist, white-supremacist, anti-Islam, anti-Semitic, and anti-
LGBTQ+” beliefs (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 6). Individuals and groups seen as 
inferior in this hierarchy can be subjected to language that is meant to 
dehumanize them and therefore make hate and violence aimed in their direction 
easier. These beliefs and language also aim to “preserve the superiority and 
dominance of some groups over others” (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 8). The far right 
utilizes this language often to target immigrants and nonwhites and they see 
demographic changes that will make Europe and North America browner and 
blacker as a threat. 
This threat is the basis for the far right category Miller-Idriss (2020) refers 
to as “existential demographic threats and dystopian conspiracy theories” (p. 9). 
Overall, this concern is referred to in the global far right as the “great 
replacement.” The “great replacement” specifically is seen as a purposeful global 
plan to replace white Christians with nonwhites and non-Christians. The far right 
charges that this plan is being carried out by national and global elites, 
specifically Jews, who are a popular target of far right conspiracy theorists, both 
historically and in the present (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). The fear is that due to 
immigration and refugees, in addition to demographic patterns like lower birth 
rates in European and North American countries, a “white genocide” will occur. 
The term “white genocide” is used more often in North America, while in Europe 
the term “Eurabia” is more often used to reflect the perceived threat from Muslim 
immigration to the continent (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). The term “great 




replacement” was created by French far right scholar Renaud Camus in 2011 
and has been used as a “framework” to embed the various far right conspiracies 
and existential threats (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). This shared perception of the 
threat of immigration and demographic change is also a unifying one among the 
global far right and is seen as a common cause for action (Miller-Idriss, 2020, 
p.11; see also Baele et al., 2020). Miller-Idriss (2020) recounts just some of the 
recent instances of far right violence where the perpetrator has been inspired by 
these ideas: the Norway attack in 2011, the 2019 Christchurch attack, the 2018 
Pittsburgh Synagogue attack, and the 2019 El Paso Walmart attack. Indeed, the 
killers often reference each other in online writings they post before their attacks. 
According to Miller-Idriss (2020), over the last few years an important change has 
occurred, the far right does not just use conspiracy theories to “frame far-right 
ideas,” rather “they are motivating violent action” (p.12).  
The final of Miller-Idriss’s four categories to describe the far right is 
apocalyptic fantasies. On the extreme far right, the belief is that the conspiracies 
discussed previously will lead to an imminent apocalypse, which some of the far 
right want to accelerate. These actors see the coming apocalypse as necessary 
to enable the creation of the “ethnostate,” the creation of a white, Christian 
homeland. Accelerationists want to speed up this process by instigating societal 
chaos, sometimes expressed by the desire to engage in race war (in America) 
and to bring on the collapse of democratic government, or Day X (in Germany) 
(Bennhold, K., 2021).   




In this paper, the term “far right” will be used to discuss the individuals and 
groups that follow, engage in, and believe the phenomena described in the 
previous section. Among the literature and scholars, there is no one accepted 
term for this phenomenon. Idriss-Miller’s (2020) discussion of contested labels 
stresses that the label “far right” is the “best bad term” available and that it “must 
always be used and understood as representing a spectrum of beliefs and 
approaches” (p. 18). 
 
What Makes the Far Right Extremist? 
 Extremism researcher JM Berger’s (2018) definition of extremism “refers 
to the belief that an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from 
the need for hostile action against the out-group” (p. 44). Utilizing Henri Tajfel 
and John C. Turner’s (1978) Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, 
Berger has created a framework for understanding extremism. Berger (2018) 
builds on Tajfel and Turner’s (1978) ideas of in-groups and out-groups. Berger 
(2018) explains that identity is something that is created, and people often 
identify with many groups based on different ways they see themselves; they are 
part of in-groups based on the perception of a shared identity (p. 6). These 
groups can be simple, for example based on living in a common city, or being 
fans of the same sports teams. However, some in-groups are more involved and 
over time details and events experienced by the groups collate into an in-group 
narrative (Berger, 2018, p. 53). Parallel to an in-group’s development is the 




development of the out-group, those not eligible for in-group status. Berger 
(2018) notes that extremist in-groups clearly define boundaries regarding who 
qualifies for the in-group, more so than non-extremist in-groups, where 
boundaries may be blurrier and of lower stake. An extremist in-group eliminates 
“gray areas” by explicitly outlining the answers to the following questions:  
What makes an individual part of the group, why the in-group has 
legitimacy, what makes an individual part of the out-group, why the out-
group is less legitimate than the in-group, and how members of the in-
group should interact with members of the out-group? (p. 53).  
The in-group builds its own identity by addressing these questions and by 
creating and articulating its beliefs, traits, and practices. The practices of the in-
group are formed from past, current, and future behavior. Berger (2018) argues 
that over time, this all coalesces into the in-group’s “story of us” (p. 54).  
For extremist in-groups, the story of the out-group, though, is created and 
viewed much differently. Since none of the in-group members are part of the out-
group, firsthand knowledge is often lacking and information about the out-group 
is often based on less reliable sources. Further, Berger notes that the in-group’s 
definition of the out-group tends to be negative, even toxic, and the in-group 
highlights negative data about the out-group while rebutting or ignoring positive 
data. The story of the out-group “usually includes a mix of truth, interpretation, 
and fiction” (p. 57). This dynamic is only considered extremist, following Berger’s 
framework, if the in-group asserts that hostile action must be taken against the 




out-group, because they believe that otherwise the success and survival of the 
in-group cannot be assured. This is the line that Berger uses to delineate hate or 
run of the mill in-group/out-group tensions, or even some forms of violence, from 
extremism: hostile action. Hostile actions range from shunning and discrimination 
to violence and at the extreme, genocide.  
Extremist in-groups frame the need for hostile action as a solution to a 
crisis. The crisis arises from the “belief an out-group must be impeding the in-
group’s success in some way, and that impedance proceeds from the intrinsic 
identity of the out-group” (Berger, 2018, p. 76). There are five common crisis 
narratives identified by Berger: impurity, conspiracy, dystopia, existential threat 
and apocalypse (pps. 82-83). Since extremists believe the out-group is impeding 
the success of the in-group through these actions that comprise the crisis 
narratives, the in-groups propose the required solution. Solutions, as articulated 
the extremists, include harassment, discrimination, segregation, hate crimes, 
terrorism, oppression, war and genocide (Berger, 2018, pps. 99-100). 
Returning to Cynthia Idriss-Miller’s four overlapping categories of the far 
right, it is helpful to place them within Berger’s extremist framework (Miller-Idriss 
uses Berger’s definition of extremism in her work Hate in the Homeland). For 
those who identify with the “antigovernment and antidemocratic practices and 
ideals” in-group, the government and those who support it are seen as the out-
group and hostile actions are taken to try to undermine and ultimately destroy 
democratic governments. We see this both in the United States with the rising 




popularity of groups like the Oath Keepers (Jackson, 2020), who helped plan the 
January 6, 2021, attack on the US capitol building (Follman & Friedman, 
2021) and in Germany with far right infiltration of law enforcement and military. 
Personnel clandestinely join far right groups that aim to eliminate Germany’s 
democratic government, which will occur on the much anticipated Day X. This 
has led to the disbandment of an elite military unit, reorganizations of police 
units, expulsions from the force, and criminal trials (Bennhold, K., 2021).  
The far right category of exclusionary beliefs encompasses a large variety 
of extremist groups where the in-group hates and targets the out-group (or 
groups) for hostile action due to their identity. Popular targets today include Black 
Lives Matter, LGBTQ+ individuals and groups, Asian Americans (a renewed 
target as a result of anti-Asian rhetoric related to the Covid 19 pandemic), Jews, 
women perceived to be or self-identified as feminists, and Muslims. 
Ethnonationalism is a potent force that is not only growing amongst “whites” in 
North America and Europe, but also in India as Hindu nationalists on the right 
target Muslims, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Leidig, 2020, February; 
Roy, 2021).  
Currently the in-group that best exemplifies existential threats and 
conspiracies category of the far right is QAnon. While there are many narratives 
amongst QAnon beliefs, essential to them all is that Democratic elites in the 
United States and Hollywood actors are part of a “cabal” that former President 
Donald Trump will save the world from. This conspiracy theory has spread from 




the United States to Europe, finding popularity especially in France (Gilbert, 
2021). Many of the attackers on the US Capitol on January 6 were followers of 
QAnon (Rubin et al., 2021). The followers of Q, who is believed to have had top 
level access to government secrets, refer to “the storm” as the day when the evil 
elites will be taken down by the return of Donald Trump. This leads to the last 
category, apocalyptic fantasies. Those that fall in this in-group want to accelerate 
what they see as the inevitable end. Often this means that their self-identified in-
group, usually white, Christian and patriarchal will assume power, which means 
there would be several out-groups, all of whom would be eliminated, by violence 
in a race war, a revolution, or by sending them elsewhere.  
 
Historical Overview of the Online Presence of the Far Right  
  The far right adopted the use of the internet early. By 1984 there were 
three different computer bulletin board systems (BBS): Info. International 
Network, Aryan Liberty Net, and White Aryan Resistance (W.A.R.) Net (Berlet, 
2001). These early online far right networks were a way for individuals with home 
computers, modems, and phone lines to dial into and log onto the BBS system. 
On the BBS, individuals were able to access a directory of files for download. 
Features that were quickly added included the ability to post public messages, 
read text, and exchange group files (Berlet, 2001). The very first far right BBS 
was created by George P. Dietz, a well-known publisher of antisemitic and racist 
works, whose welcome message on the site said it was “The only computer 




bulletin board system and uncontrolled information medium in the United States 
of America dedicated to the dissemination of historical facts—not fiction!” (Berlet, 
2001, p. 2). Launched in March of 1984, by June of that same year the directory 
of the BBS listed ten different sections of information, including sections entitled: 
“Holocaust: Fact or Fiction?” “The Jew in Review,” and “On Race and Religion” 
(Berlet, 2001, p. 2). Shortly after the creation of Dietz’s BBS, Klan leader and 
influential far right personality, Louis Beam launched Aryan Liberty Net, with the 
help (and probably funds) of Richard Butler, the leader of the Aryan Nations 
Christian Identity located in Hayden Lake, Idaho (Berlet, 2001; ADL, 1985). This 
BBS posted the following all caps message in June of 1985:  
FINALLY, WE ARE ALL GOING TO BE LINKED TOGETHER AT ONE 
POINT IN TIME. IMAGINE IF YOU WILL, ALL OF THE GREAT MINDS 
OF THE PATRIOTIC CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT LINKED TOGETHER 
AND JOINED INTO ONE COMPUTER. ALL THE YEARS OF COMBINED 
EXPERIENCE AVAILABLE TO THE MOVEMENT. NOW IMAGINE 
BEING ABLE TO CALL UP AND ACCESS THOSE MINDS, TO DEAL 
WITH THE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES THAT AFFECT HIM. YOU ARE 
ONLINE WITH THE ARYAN NATIONS BRAIN TRUST. IT IS HERE TO 
SERVE THE FOLK. (Berlet, 2001, p. 4). 
 One of the goals of the BBS, according to Beam, was to allow users in Canada 
and Europe, where much of the hate literature was censored, access to it 
(ADL, 1985). White Aryan Resistance leader Tom Metzger noted that “White 




Aryan comrades of the North have destroyed the free speech blackout to our 
Canadian comrades” (Berlet, 2001, p. 4), and when he created the W.A.R. 
Computer Terminal BBS by late 1984 or early 1985, he sent out a message to 
“any Aryan patriot in America” (Berlet, 2001, p. 4). From the start the far right 
presence on the internet was not only to spread hate and propaganda, but also 
to create transnational collaboration.   
 From that point the far right expanded into the internet with the innovation 
of web 1.0, these are the earliest type of websites that were read only, though 
over time they became more involved with links and more engaging audiovisual 
content (Baele et al., 2020). The most influential was probably Stormfront, a 
white supremacist website and message board created by Ku Klux Klan leader 
Don Black. Stormfront is still active and counts over 800,000 monthly visits as 
well as providing 1,800 interlinked websites (Stern, 2019). Types of far right 
examples of web 1.0 include websites that provide far right content, blogs that do 
the same as well as offer commentary, far right publishers, and far right 
commercial sites selling merchandise (Baele, et al, 2020). The far right were also 
early adopters of web 2.0, or platforms centered around user driven content and 
interactions (Conway et al., 2019). Popular sites include Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, Telegram, and Reddit. When the bigger names in social media have 
deplatformed far right actors and groups, some have migrated to newer, less 
used social media platforms like Gab, Parler, and Discord. Other forums, like the 
various “chans” offer anonymous spaces for far right activity (Baele et al, 2020). 




Less well known and studied are the far right wikis, in which are far right versions 




 Imagery is foundational to the far right and it is both prominent and prolific 
in both physical and cyberspaces. For the purposes of this study, imagery is 
observed to determine how it facilitates the interaction between cyber and 
physical spaces. Two areas are of importance: the types of imagery and the 
medium on which the imagery is presented. In the literature review of the 
following chapter, these two facets of imagery are further explored.  
 
Summary 
The far right is a multi-faceted, heterogenous extremist movement that 
has increased its presence online and in physical spaces. The following chapters 
of this thesis include a literature review of the far right, using theoretical 
frameworks from social science and studies conducted among the far right 
regarding online spaces, offline spaces, and the imagery types and mediums, 
followed by chapters on the methods and results of the audio and visual analysis 
conducted to explore the research question. The study closes with a section of 
conclusions and recommendations for future research.  
 
  








In this chapter, research will focus first on theoretical frameworks to help 
understand the far right. Following the theoretical frameworks is a discussion of 
how cyberspace is utilized by the far right and how this helps with efforts at 
transnationalization. Then the use of imagery is explored, both the types of 
imagery and the mediums on which they are presented. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of imagery and its role in facilitating interaction between cyber 
and real life spaces. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks Useful in Understanding the Far Right:  
Landscapes, the Imaginary, and Ecosystems 
 
Extremism research has concentrated on jihadist terrorism (Berger, 2018), 
however of late there has been increased focus on far right extremism (Baele et 
al., 2020). The rise of far right violence, the growth of the far right presence on 
the internet, and the growth and visibility of far right events in the real world—
Charlottesville and Jan. 6, 2021—all likely have influenced the growth of 
academic research and the attention of journalists. Recent work (Belew, 2018) 
has shined the light on the fact that the far right, far from disappearing, has had a 
steady, if at times low profile, presence since at least the early 1980s. After 
Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the Edward P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City 




and the law enforcement takedown of The Order, far right groups in the United 
States primarily adopted a decentralized structure to prevent law enforcement 
infiltration and investigations (Belew, 2018). While to the general public—and 
perhaps law enforcement—this, plus the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
directed attention away from far right extremists, the movement continued to 
grow. A major factor in the growth of the far right has been the internet. Far right 
white supremacists and white nationalists used the internet quite early, before 
the general public, to sustain and grow their ranks (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003). 
Another early goal was to create and maintain international links (Berlet, 2001; 
Gerstenfeld et al., 2003). As the internet transformed from basic sites to user 
generated sites like social media platforms, the far right moved right along with 
those changes, successfully creating a presence on mainstream sites like 
Facebook and Twitter as well as on more obscure spaces like “chans” and 
dedicated discussion forums (e.g., Iron March).  
To aid in the analysis of the transnational and increasingly global 
movements of ideas and people of the far right, both in physical and virtual 
spaces, Anthropologist Arjun Appardurai’s (1996) conceptual framework of global 
landscapes is helpful. Appadurai (1996) theorizes five global “landscapes,” which 
he describes as “fluid, irregular” flows and “deeply perspectival constructs, 
inflected by historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of 
actors'' (p. 33). Among the five, ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, 
mediascapes, and ideoscapes, the last two are most relevant to this analysis of 




the far right. Mediascapes “refer both to the distribution of the electronic 
capabilities to produce and disseminate information” while ideoscapes are also 
concerned with images, they are political in nature “and frequently have to do 
with the ideologies of states and the counter ideologies of movements explicitly 
oriented at capturing state power or a piece of it” (Appadurai, 1996, pps. 35-36). 
The extreme far right’s ultimate goal is to capture state power and to rework 
society and create a white ethnostate. This framework allows for not only the 
discussion of the flows of ideas, but also for the instances where connections are 
lacking, which Appadurai (1996) labels as “disjunctures.” Among the far right the 
rhetoric is anti-globalist (Caiani & Kröll, 2015; Stern, 2019), however a 
disjuncture exists as they see the people of other places as the threat, as 
evidenced by the anti-Muslim, anti-refugee rhetoric, rather than the effects of late 
stage capitalism. Appadurai (1996) regards the scapes as the “building blocks'' of 
the global imaginary. Working from Benedict Anderson’s (2006) theory the 
“imagined communities,” Appadurai (1996) writes that “the imagination has 
become an organized field of social practices, a form of work (in the sense of 
both labor and culturally organized practice) and a form of negotiation between 
sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility” (p. 31). The 
imaginary is a potent force for the far right (Miller-Idriss, 2020; Stern, 2019). The 
idealized past and the hoped for future exist simultaneously in the far right 
imagination, and it can be seen explicitly with the use of images that harken back 
to a mythical past (Miller-Idriss, 2020). The imaginary gives space for the 




expression of foundational issues, such as “territory, belonging, exclusion, race, 
and national geographies” (Miller-Idriss, 2020). The extreme right’s envisioned 
ethnostate is a powerful imaginary, with numerous written works laying out its 
creation, most notably William Luther Pierce’s The Turner Diaries. The far right 
imaginary as a building block of global mediascapes and ideoscapes implies 
disjuncture as it is a retreat from the global, an attempt at carving out a space 
that is homogenous among an increasingly diverse world. Today those spaces 
are online and offline in the form of specific events, while the future imagined 
ethnostate is a physical space, one that is being envisioned and discussed in 
online spaces in the present.   
Place and space are important settings for the far right. Place is usually 
the ethnonationalist homeland that various far right movements claim based on 
their interpretation of history (Stern, 2019), and the physical site of the imagined 
ethnostate, but spaces offer so much more room for ideas and expression. 
Spaces are relational (Mazúr & Urbánek, 1983; Thrift, 2003) and filled by people 
and ideas, while the people and ideas are in return formed by spaces. As 
geographers Mazúr and Urbánek (1983) note, space is “‘filled’ with qualities 
given by interrelationships of elements of the landscape system and expressed 
by its structure” (p. 142). While not referring to Appadurai’s landscape 
framework, this notion fits well within the far right internet ecosystem as a 
landscape of ideas and images that inform and shape people and ideas, and in 
return the people continue to shape their spaces as a result of their interaction 




with far right spaces on the internet. Further, as evidenced by the proliferation of 
fringe social media sites developed to replace access for individuals and groups 
that have been deplatformed for hate speech or threats of violence (Scott, 2020), 
the structure of spaces of the far right are created to follow the demand of new 
spaces, to enable them to continue their flows of ideas and images. 
Free spaces are places where groups like the far right can be themselves 
without the pressure from the dominant group (Polletta, 1999). White Power 
Movement researchers Pete Simi and Robert Futrell (2006) expanded on the 
idea of free spaces refined by Francesca Polletta (1999) to create a framework 
for analyzing these spaces in the far right White Power movement. The authors 
used a multi-method approach to collect ethnographic data between 1996 and 
2005. Methods included 107 in-depth face to face and telephone interviews, 
participant observation of events, and content analysis of 48 websites and four 
internet forum groups (Simi & Futrell, 2006). They outlined three types of free 
spaces: home, event, and cyber (2006). Home is the main free space for the 
nurturing and continuation of the White Power movement (WPM) culture as this 
is where it is directly taught and reinforced through families, especially to their 
children. Events, particularly congresses, conferences and music festivals, 
represent larger scale free spaces, although because of the controversial nature 
of WPM beliefs, secrecy and use of private lands are essential to the success of 
these events. Cyberspace represents a free space that the authors argue is 
“intertwined” with real world free spaces (Simi & Futrell, 2006, p. 115), rather 




than comprising its own separate sphere. The authors describe several linkages 
between online spaces and real world spaces, including those that connect 
different WPM groups, create opportunities for continued activism and 
participation, facilitate logistical planning of events, report on real world events 
and “provide access to an array of WPM cultural items” (Simi & Futrell, 2006, p. 
119). The authors further report that the largest real world events were those that 
had the most extensive online presence (Simi & Futrell, 2006, p. 134).  
The Far Right's online presence has grown considerably since Simi and 
Futrell’s work in the early 2000s (Conway et al., 2019). Today, the number of far 
right spaces on the internet makes a comprehensive mapping of the entire entity 
an unwieldy task. Rather, an analytical framework can help make sense of it. 
Baele, Brace, and Coan (2020) offer a useful one. The researchers describe the 
far right presence online as an “ecosystem’ (p. 2), an “entity made of an ever-
changing number of different components whose natures and interconnections 
are in constant evolution (as opposed to a static landscape made of a fixed 
number of well defined objects)” (p. 2). The authors further delineate the four 
levels of the far right ecosystem. At the simplest level are the “entities,” or 
individual domains, examples include blogs and Facebook group pages. 
“Communities” consist of “entities” that are linked: through hyperlinks, content 
flows, and user migration flows (p. 4). The “communities” are dynamic, both 
organically and strategically formed, and the “overall far-right ecosystem may 
thus be understood as a network made of a multitude of communities of linked 




entities” (p. 4). Communities can be organized by type into “biotopes,” and the 
authors adopt Davey et al.’s five suggested categories for the far right 
ecosystem: white supremacists, ethno-nationalists, militia-groups (anti-
state/government), the “manosphere,” and the alt-right (p. 4). Biotopes overlap 
and reflect the dynamic nature of the internet. Together the biotopes constitute 
the far right “ecosystem.” Internet culture is ever changing, and this creates 
difficulties in analysis, therefore this analytical framework is useful in creating a 
language for organization and analysis beyond what is currently relevant 
amongst the far right internet ecosystem, whether it be blogs that are popular or 
fringe social media sites that emerge after a deplatforming. In addition to offering 
this analytical framework, Baele et al. suggest a research agenda, as the rise in 
far right extremism has resulted in increased academic attention and given the 
dearth of previous research as compared to other types of extremism, particularly 
jihadist extremism.  





Figure. 1 Far-Right Online Ecosystem (Baele et al., 2020, p. 5) 
 
Cyberspace and Growing Transnational Ties Among the Far Right 
The far right uses the online ecosystem for the purposes of attracting new 
adherents, continuing engagement, fellowship, and coordination and the growing 
transnational nature of this landscape is reflected in all these areas of purpose. 
Since the early bulletin board systems of white nationalists in the US, the far right 
has utilized the internet to make transnational connections (ADL, 185; Berlet, 
2001).  Stormfront, the oldest major far right website, has sections labeled by 
country and numerous links to international far right websites (Bowman-Grieve, 
2009). Recent research has found that the far right has used Twitter effectively to 
engage in transnational anti-immigrant and protectionist economic policy 




discourse (Froio & Ganesh, 2019). A recent leak from the web forum Iron March, 
now defunct, reveals major collaboration between far right individuals connected 
to Atomwaffen. Iron March grew out an earlier version called International Third 
Position Forum, which “was launched by a Russian, produced a terror group in 
the U.S., and facilitated coordination among terror groupings in the U.K. and 
elsewhere, all through the power of the internet” (Ross et al., 2019). Extremism 
researchers Manuela Caiani and Patricia Kröll (2015) investigated “the degree 
and forms of extreme far right transnationalization (in terms of mobilization, 
issues, targets, action strategies, and organizational contacts) and the potential 
role of the internet in these developments'' (p. 331). The research involved 
interviews with 54 representatives of six right wing organizations within Europe 
and the United States in addition to conducting a formalized web content analysis 
of 336 far right websites. They found that while most far right actions take place 
at the local level, the transnational landscape is growing, widespread and that the 
internet is assisting this process in three ways: increasing supranational targets, 
giving opportunity to “stage supranational organization,” and the creation of new 
transnational organizations (p. 343). The far right in the United States is the most 
transnationalized, however a particularly close relationship between the British 
and French far right exists which is constituted by both online and offline spaces, 
and in Germany the far right actors which most used the web were also most 
effective in “staging transnational activities'' (p. 343). The internet is used as a 
tool, both on the local and transnational level, to “attract new members... 




propagate their ideals among like-minded people, and connect individuals and 
organizations'' (p. 343).    
Connections built online lead to real world transnational meetings. In the 
past, music festivals, particularly in Europe, were popular far right events that 
would draw an audience from overseas (Yousef, 2020). Recently, Mixed Martial 
Arts (MMA) events hosted by far right individuals in Europe also tend to draw 
international participants (Miller-Idriss, 2020). Far right actors from the United 
States have trained in the Ukraine (Rotella, 2021). Far right politicians in Europe 
are also engaging in transnational connections. In 2019, a group of 23, of whom 
most were from far right political parties, visited Kashmir, the site of contested 
land between India and Pakistan (Leidig, 2020, January 21). Far right 
connections between North America and Europe have existed for decades, it 
appears these connections are growing, in addition to branching out in solidarity 
with more far flung countries, as with India.  
 
The Role of Imagery 
Language is an obstacle for transnational communication. The far right’s 
use of imagery is one way to overcome this block. In Europe, far right imagery in 
the form of a cartoon was effective in spreading messaging across language 
barriers (Doerr, 2017). Researcher Nicole Doerr analyzed anti-immigrant 
cartoons originally produced in Switzerland, and how those images were 




understood and transferred to audiences in Germany and Italy to show a sense 
of anti-immigrant solidarity between the far right of those nations (Doerr, 2017).  
Far right imagery is prevalent and prominent in both online and offline 
spaces. Online mostly in the form of memes and offline on flags, t-shirts, stickers, 
patches, pins, and even tattoos. Most far right memes are created in the 
anonymous “chans” and then flow through other online entities as users visit 
other online far right spaces and share them (Baele et al., 2020). Many of the 
memes include imagery that is created by ever changing internet culture, for 
example the Boogaloo Bois preference for igloos and Hawaiian shirts. Neither 
igloos nor Hawaiian shirts have any historic tie to far right ideology or symbolism. 
Some memes have staying power, most significantly Pepe the Frog, an early 
internet meme that was appropriated by the far right, and the Red Pill memes, 
signifying an awakening to the far right cause, which originated from the Matrix 
movie series (Stern, 2021). The origins of some far right imagery, like Nazi and 
Confederate symbols, are historic and predate the internet. This imagery has 
become less visible, however, since many among the far right realize that the 
extreme nature of these symbols might turn away potential adherents who might 
need a softer, less controversial entry into the far right (Stern, 2019). The far right 
is reaching even further into the past to use Norse and Celtic imagery as 
symbolic of white European civilization and their perceived need to preserve and 
protect it (Miller-Idriss, 2020). This imagery appears in both Europe and North 
America. These images have made their way into contemporary online spaces, 




as well as being a staple on physical items like t-shirts and flags. Online stores 
have flourished, and the quality of the merchandise has improved. In the past, 
shirts were often screen printed and of low quality. Today over a dozen high 
quality, far right clothing brands exist, sold on sophisticated websites that include 
currency converters for international customers (Miller-Idriss, 2020). There is also 
evidence of transnational solidarity in this arena: a Polish website sell shirts 
emblazoned with the Confederate flag, while in Russia images of Germanic 
history like Vikings are popular (Miller-Idriss, 2020). In the U.S., the Proud Boys 
and Oath Keepers both have high quality, original clothing and imagery. Public 
events and protests throughout 2020 featured both groups present in gear that 
was easily recognizable and highly visible.  
In the United States, support among the far right for former President 
Donald Trump is strong and pro Trump flags, shirts, and hats are ubiquitous at 
rallies and events frequented by the far right, as are American flags, American 
historical flags and symbols. Researcher Cynthia Miller-Idriss writes: 
 Hate clothing celebrates violence in the name of a cause---often using 
patriotic images and phrases and calls to act like an American, along with 
Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, and white-supremacist messages. In this way, 
far-right clothing links patriotism with violence and xenophobia. (2020, p. 
80) 




While it is likely impossible to determine if someone wearing American patriotic 
gear is a member or sympathizer of the far right, the far right does use American 
patriotic imagery (Miller-Idriss, 2020). 
 
Summary 
The far right can be better understood by applying theoretical frameworks 
from the social sciences. It is not a monolithic set of groups and actors, rather a 
large movement tied together by various far right ideologies. International ties 
were undertaken early using the power of the internet, and research shows these 
ties are growing and even branching out from the western world. The presence of 
the far right on the internet is both historical and of contemporary concern. The 
goal of this study is to add to the discussion of how online spaces are used 
together with physical spaces and the role of imagery in facilitating those 
processes. While Simi and Futrell found that far right cyber and real world spaces 
are “intertwined” (2006), there is a lack of research regarding the role of imagery 
in this process. Miller-Idriss contends, “that symbols and iconography move 
between online and offline spaces as they are deployed and co-opted by the far 
right in ways that deserve our close attention” (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 133). She 
suggests, “more empirical research is needed to disentangle variations in the 
utility of symbols in offline and online spaces for insider and outsider recognition, 
communication of far-right messages, and the degree of commitment they 
require to far right ideas” (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 133). The visual and audio 




analysis in the next chapter is an attempt to help understand how imagery was 
used on the events of January 6, 2021, at the U.S. Capitol where both offline and 




























The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the ways in which far right cyber 
spaces and real life spaces are used in tandem and how images facilitate the use 
of those spaces. For the purposes of this study, it was determined that the safest 
and most reliable way to procure data would be from third party sources. The 
shorter time length of this study did not allow for inroads and relationships to be 
created with far right actors in order to engage in interviews or distribute surveys. 
Additionally, while research for this project was being conducted, the events of 
January 6, 2021, occurred at the United States Capitol building. Video recordings 
of the events by participants were played by the media and reports signaled that 
the day’s participants, including far right groups and actors, planned the events 
using the internet (Lytvynenko & Hensley-Clancy, 2021). Significantly, the public 
contents of Parler, a web platform popular with the far right (Katz, 2020), were 
saved to the internet archive by a group of internet activists prior to the service 
losing its Amazon Web Services hosting and its app being removed from the 
Google and Apple app stores (Wong & Morse, 2021). This deplatforming was a 
direct result of the Parler’s inaction in dealing with the violent and insurrectionist 
content on January 6, 2021 (Wong & Morse, 2021). According to the internet 
programmers that—anonymously—uploaded the data, this cache consisted of 




99% of Parler’s public contents, including thousands of recordings from the 
January 6, 2021, incident. Of these thousands of video recordings, investigative 
journalism non-profit ProPublica released 500 as an effort to provide data to the 
public (Klein & Kao, 2021). This database provided by ProPublica was used to 
complete the audio and visual analysis for this thesis based on the use of this 
platform by far right groups and individuals, its accessibility, and the historical 




For this thesis, an audio and visual analysis was conducted on 100 of the 
500 Parler video recordings of January 6, 2020, that were provided in the 
ProPublica database. A flaw in Parler’s code at the time of the site’s content 
retrieval not only made the recordings—and other content—easy to access and 
save, but it also included the videos original geolocation and time stamps 
(Greenberg, 2021). Using that information, ProPublica’s database provided each 
video recording with a time and label by location: around Capitol, near Capitol, 
and inside Capitol. The first video posted on the database was recorded at 12:01 
PM Eastern Standard Time while the last video posted was recorded at 5:39 PM 
Eastern Standard Time. Each video recording was analyzed to determine which, 
if any, symbols or imagery were present on individuals and the flags flown by 
individuals. Additionally, an audio analysis was conducted on each video: when 




individuals “selfie” narrated the event, or were clearly heard behind the recording 
device, the contents of the narration were either collected word for word (shorter 
recordings) or summarized with some quotes recorded (longer, repetitive 
recordings). 
 
Sampling and Procedures 
Data was collected by generating 100 random numbers out of 500 using 
an internet random number generator (Urbaniak & Plous, 2021). Random 
sampling was chosen as it seemed the best way to capture a representative slice 
of the 500 videos. Utilizing a Google Form format, each of the 100 videos was 
analyzed for the following: flags, hats/beanies, clothing (shirts/pants/jackets), 
pins/patches, chants/songs, and narration. An individual Google form was filled 
out for each video. When these items were observed or heard, a check mark 
notation system was used to record imagery and words used. Additional checks 
were not added if more than one of the same item was viewed. Under each 
category listed above were the descriptive analysis markers: Pro Trump, 
American, Anti-Biden, Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Gadsden, Confederate, 
QAnon, American Betsy Ross, Three Percent Flag, and America First, and 
others, with some slight variation among the categories (see Appendix A). Using 
the Google form allowed for additional descriptive markers to be included as 
needed during the analysis, but no markers were removed during the process. A 
handwritten list was also created to cross reference the sample number with the 




timestamp and length of the video, and its place out of the 500 videos. This step 
was necessary because ProPublica’s database did not number the videos, 
however the videos were posted in sequential order by time of day and sorted by 
location. Each video was viewed at least twice, many were viewed five or more 
times, depending on the length and content of the video. Once all 100 videos 
were viewed and their associated Google forms were submitted, the data was 
then available in several formats: summaries of each question (including charts 
and graphs), by question, and by individual entry. A Google Sheet spreadsheet 
was also auto generated after the last form was submitted. This allowed for both 
visual and textual data analysis.  
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were conducted on the video 
recordings. However, it must be noted that the quantitative analysis is not meant 
to be a full record of the types and numbers of imagery present on January 6, 
2021, at the US Capitol. Since the videos were often of the same crowd spaces 
but from various individuals reflecting their position in the crowd, the scenes must 
show the same individuals and flags, therefore a counting was deemed 
unrealistic and prone to error. The same is true for some of the chants recorded 
in videos from the same crowd space and at around the same time. Rather, the 
point is to provide a qualitative analysis of the day, specifically checking for 
markers of far right groups and actors, including imagery and rhetoric, and 
reflecting on how these markers facilitate the use of both real life and cyber 
spaces. It is likely that the events of January 6, 2021, at the US Capitol will be 




researched and analyzed for years to come. Several news analyses have been 
published in just the few months since and undoubtedly much academic research 
is ongoing. This small study is meant to add to the discussion of the events of the 
day, specifically how cyberspace and real life space became one during the 


























This study is an analysis of videos taken on January 6, 2021, around, 
nearby, and inside the United States Capitol building and posted to the social 
media platform Parler by participants of that event. Audio and visual analysis was 
conducted on 100 videos to determine what, if any, far right imagery and rhetoric 
was used by participants of January 6 as they recorded themselves and others. 
The videos represent a merging of cyber and real life spaces. The results of the 
analysis show the predominant imagery visible during the incident was pro 
Trump, followed by the American flag imagery. The results also show a distinct 
lack of imagery from far right groups that were known to be at the Capitol that 
day. Finally, the audio analysis provides a narrative window into the actions of 
the participants of January 6 as the cyber and real life space intertwined to 
become one space. The following sections examine the results of the visual 











Of the 100 videos studied, most were recorded near the Capitol, followed 
by around the Capitol, and inside the Capitol. The following chart details the 
numerical breakdown: 
Pie chart auto generated by Google Forms 
Figure 2. Video Recordings by Location  
The full 500 videos posted by ProPublica (Groeger et al., 2021) also are majority 
near, followed by around, and inside which affirms the random sample as being 
representative as far as location.  
Visual Analysis Findings  
 The visual analysis of the flags, garments, hats/beanies, and patches and 
pins shows pro Trump and American Flag designs to be the most prevalent 
imagery visible from the January 6 videos of the Capitol. The Gadsden Flag and 
the Betsy Ross flag were also popular images. Little far right imagery was easily 
spotted in the videos. Oath Keepers imagery made a small appearance, the 




Proud Boys, even smaller with just one sighting, as well as a few Kekistan flags 
(alt-right imagery), though the far right group with the greatest visible presence 
as far as imagery was America First.  
 The weather on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C was in the low 40s 
Fahrenheit between the hours of 12 PM and 6 PM. The weather likely influenced 
the prevalence of beanies, hats, and coats. The great majority of beanies and 
Make America Great Again (MAGA) hats appeared identical; perhaps many were 
bought at concession stands at the rally before the march to the Capitol. 
Overcoats covered many people’s shirts, leading to difficulty in seeing t-shirts for 
analysis. Patches and pins were also hard to see for the same reason in addition 
to the relatively unsophisticated software and computer used for this analysis. It 
was difficult to focus and zoom in on items as small as patches and pins, 
particularly given the crowd sizes in some of the video clips. Overall, as the 
figures below demonstrate, most imagery present on January 6, 2021, at the US 
Capitol was pro Trump and American flag related. This finding is reflective of the 
known agendas of the far right groups at the Capitol that day. While there was 
scant far right imagery, there was a lot of nondescript, camouflage and tactical 
gear. These were not categories analyzed in the study; however, they were 
noticeable, along with the lack of far right imagery that had been prevalent at 
other “Stop the Steal” related events leading up to the events at the Capitol on 
Jan. 6. It is also known from law enforcement arrests (Kunzelman & Durkin 
Richer, 2021) that far right actors both planned and executed attacks that day.  






























Audio Analysis Findings 
Chants and songs could be heard throughout the video recordings of Jan. 
6. The two most common chants were “USA!” and “stop the steal!” The National 
Anthem was sung a few times and the Pledge of Allegiance was recited. Some of 
the chants were only repeated by one or a few people, however they were clearly 
heard on the video, so they were recorded for this study. These chants and the 
narration, by people both in front of and behind the camera, reflect what are 
known to be the events of the day. Earlier in the day, between 1 PM and 2 PM, 
the audio analysis shows rhetoric surrounding the election and demands to “stop 
the steal” and “let us in,” by midway through the events, between 2 PM and 3PM, 
the tone and words changed to reflect the crowd knew the Capitol had been 
breached and shouts were heard to help, and videos were then filmed inside the 
Capitol, rather than just near or around. After 3 PM, some of the individuals 
inside the building are seen leaving, to cheers and congratulations, and law 



















Table 3. Chants and Songs  
 
Video recorded at 12:59 PM (Groeger et al., 2021, video 12) near the 
Capitol shows a man standing on the steps yelling, “We already voted, and what 
have they done? They stole it! We want our fucking country back. Let’s take 
it…[unintelligible] come on, come on!” Throughout the clip are shouts by others: 
“stop the steal!” “let us in!” “join us!” “all lives matter” “USA!” and “we the people.” 




Seven minutes later, also nearby, a video shows the crowd pushing toward the 
building, and a man off camera can be heard saying, “People have taken over 
the Capitol building. Storming the walls and storming the Capitol. This is our 
house!” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 21). One minute later, at 1:07 PM, a video 
was posted from around the Capitol that showed Trump on the big screen telling 
the crowd at the “Save America” rally at the Ellipse that “if you don’t fight like hell, 
we won’t have a country anymore” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 24). The next 
three recordings cover about a thirty minute period between 1:07 PM and 1:35 
PM. Various chants are heard: “traitors!” “hold the line!” “USA!” “hands up, don’t 
shoot!” and “fuck you!” along with one man who exclaims “It’s a fucking war zone 
out here boys!” (Groeger et al., 2021, videos 47, 53, 59). Far right figure Alex 
Jones appears on a video at 1:51 PM. He is holding a bullhorn and telling the 
crowd to relocate to the other side of the Capitol where he says there are permits 
for the event. He called the police “provocateurs” and told the crowd not to 
engage with the police and “give the system what they want” (Groeger et al., 
2021, video 79).   
At 2:01 PM, a man can be heard yelling during video 100, “They just 
breached it. They’re storming the Capitol. Hell yeah!” (Groeger et al., 2021). 
Videos filmed over the next ten minutes are full of people encouraging the 
Capitol attack. Various directions were given: “Whoo! Yeah! Yeah! Push 
forward!” “Fucking go! They need our help” (Groeger et al., 2021, videos 193, 
196). Video 122 shows the crowd surging towards the building, and one man can 




be heard instructing them that “we need to have this area completely occupied. 
It’s an easy push forward!” (Groeger et al., 2021). A video posted a minute later 
captures a man breaking the windows of the Capitol building before being tackled 
by the police. Some in the crowd shout to “leave him alone” while others say, “he 
was breaking the law” and to leave the police alone since they are just “doing 
their job” (Groeger et al., 2021). At 2:25 PM a man can be heard on recording 
171 saying “They got the door open. They got the door open. They’re in” to which 
another man replies, “This is our house too, brother” (Groeger et al., 2021). The 
chants in the background of several of these videos are “stop the steal” and 
“USA!”  
The first video of the sample set from inside the Capitol occurred at 2:34 
PM and it consists of a man yelling, “Where are the fucking traitors? Drag them 
out by their fucking hair. Where are the fucking traitors?” after which someone 
near his voice replied, “Come on, who’s first?” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 209). 
A minute later a man can be heard in another video from inside the Capitol 
yelling, “You’ve paid for this. Hey, cover your face. Let’s go!” (Groeger et al., 
2021, video 215). The videos posted in and near the Capitol at this point—
between 2 PM and 3 PM—are the densest in terms of amount per minute. Most 
show the crowd pushing up against the Capitol. One video, however, is further 
away and the Capitol building can be seen in the near distance. The video shows 
a young man in a suit and tie, possibly far right leader Nick Fuentes, speaking to 
the crowd with a bullhorn. He is standing on steps, with people around him 




wearing America First (AF) shirts and flying AF flags. He begins with “Honestly, I 
think people talk too much about Socialism. The real threat to this country isn’t 
socialism, it’s globalism.” He says the country has been taken over by “foreign, 
global special interests” and continues his speech “they are attempting to replace 
our population,” “that globalism is the antithesis of nationalism,” and that they 
“want to erase our borders, erase our identity.” He argues for revolution 
contending that he hopes it happens “bloodlessly, or it can take place another 
way, either way this American revolution must take place!” (Groeger et al., 2021, 
video 242). The crowd cheers.  
A man wearing a MAGA hat self-narrates a video near the Capitol at 2:51 
PM. He calls the members of Congress “cowards” that “hid inside and were 
emergency escorted away because of their fear of the people.” He also calls 
former Vice President Pence a “treasonous pig” whose “name will be mud 
forever” before concluding with “now the real battle begins” (Groeger et al., 2021, 
video 292). During video 329 at 3:01 PM a woman can be heard off screen 
saying “This is beautiful. This is awesome…. you know what? This is what 
happens when you don’t like us and you didn’t fight for us” as the camera pans 
the crowd pushing toward the Capitol (Groeger et al., 2021). Three minutes later 
a video shows another woman in a MAGA hat self-narrating her video. She 
states:  
I’m live at the Capitol building, where we have overtaken the building, and 
wondering if the media hears us now? If there is any media here, I don’t 




see any media, Proud Boys are here. I don’t see Antifa. It’s all protestors 
saying, “stop the steal.” We climbed the walls; we climbed the scaffolding 
and hung an American flag. There’s no violence here, but we’re upset. 
The lies, the stealing, needs to end, and our government needs to listen. 
Do you hear us now? (Groeger et al., 2021, video 340) 
Another three minutes after this video, events begin to transition. Some videos 
are still showing the crowd pushing against the police at doors and windows, as 
well as videos of participants inside the Capitol, however there is now footage of 
individuals leaving the building.  
 A video showing a line of men leaving the building to cheers and 
exclamations of “way to go” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 347) is posted at 3:07 
PM. At 3:25 PM the man called the “Q Shaman” by the media—Jake Angeli—is 
seen exiting the Capitol while yelling out “freedom,” the crowd responded back 
“freedom!” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 399). A few minutes later, a clip shows a 
line of police officers in riot gear walking toward the Capitol building and man off 
camera yells, “Hey those are good people up there, you don’t need none of that” 
(Groeger et al., 2021, video 407). By 3:41 PM police officers can be seen 
pushing out the doors of the building, down the steps, and away from the building 
as two men behind the camera converse: one states, “They’re leaving” and the 
other replies, “I doubt that—they’re letting them down to the bottom so they push 
us all back. We’ll see, they’ll play like your friend and stab you in the back” 
(Groeger et al., 2021, video 420). The next few videos of the sample have no 




narration, although in one a loud “USA!” chant is heard as the crowd seems like it 
is trying to keep the energy up as events appear to be winding down. At 4:01 PM 
a man outside the doors of the Capitol is shown on camera speaking through the 
bullhorn, “My three kids are going to grow up in this country. And I want them to 
respect my house. And that makes us different. We will stand our ground. But the 
police are not the problem” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 462). A minute later 
another clip shows the crowd singing the first few lines of “Amazing Grace” 
before it tapers off and a man behind the camera remarks that no one seems to 
know the rest of the lyrics (Groeger et al., 2021, video 463).  
 The following clip shows a group of men and women walking away from 
the event and speaking in Spanish to the camera. They are speaking about their 
support for Trump and the cause, as well as their Cuban and Dominican 
backgrounds (Groeger et al., 2021, video 471). The final video in the sample also 
shows a man who has just left, and he is speaking to the man holding the 
camera about a shooting he saw in the Capitol. The man in front of the camera is 
probably referencing the shooting of Ashley Babbitt that occurred inside the 
Capitol. The man behind the camera claims to be a pastor and he initiates a 
prayer over the man’s head. During the prayer he calls the man a “lion” and a 








Table 4. Narration by Speakers On and Off Camera 
 




Discussion of Findings 
 While the above narrative based on the audio analysis does not include all 
the narrative events of the day, it is representative of the whole. The visual 
analysis is similar in that while a notation system was used to record the various 
images, it was not a comprehensive count of imagery. The hope was that this 
analysis is still useful in understanding how the physical spaces on January 6, 
2021, intertwined and became one with the virtual spaces as participants actively 
recorded their and other’s participation in the events of that day, and how the 
ubiquitous use of imagery was a part of this process.  
The findings from these analyses show that while some far right imagery 
was not as visible as in prior “stop the steal” related events, it was still present, 
particularly imagery related to far right movements QAnon, America First, Three 
Percenters, and Groypers (as those who fly the America First and follow far right 
leader Nick Fuentes refer to themselves). While the two high profile groups, Oath 
Keepers and Proud Boys, kept their imagery visibility low, their presence and 
planning at the event is known. The audio analysis supports this as phrases used 
by members of the crowd reflect trained and organized action. These include 
directions given such as “cover your face, let’s go,” “we need to have this area 
completely occupied, it’s an easy push forward,” “push forward,” and “fucking go, 
they need our help” (Groeger et al., 2021). These phrases stood out from other 
crowd exclamations like “Whoo,” “Hell yeah,” and those in the back of the crowd 
saying things like “they are storming the castle, they are going in, the patriots are 




storming the castle” (Groeger et al., 2021). The phrase “patriots” was used 
repeatedly to refer to people in the crowd engaged in attack or by people 
referring to themselves as patriots because of their participation that day.  
The use of term patriot and the historical imagery often associated with it 
among the far right, including the Betsy Ross flag and the Gadsden flag, reflect 
the far right’s reverence for times before the current, more diverse era. It also 
represents the use of patriotic imagery to reaffirm the far right’s claim to the 
ethnonational homelands. It is impossible to discern those in the crowd who were 
“normie” Trump supporters, as they are called by the far right, and those who 
were far right actors, but both are known to use patriotic imagery. Some of the 
flags that day became weapons as videos show individuals using flag poles to 
break into the building and beat and push back law enforcement (Groeger et al., 
2021).  
The results of the analysis also reveal the tension between far right groups 
that support and contain members of law enforcement and those who harbor 
antigovernment sentiments. Crowd treatment of law enforcement was a theme 
that ran through many of the videos. Some participants implored the crowd to 
respect the police while the videos also clearly showed the police being attacked 
by the crowds (Groeger et al., 2021). In some videos the crowd can heard 
defending those that attacked and entered the building, telling the police to leave 
them alone and that they are “good people” (Groeger et al., 2021).  




The most visible far right group on January 6, 2021, were those pushing 
the American First ideology. This group is led by Nick Fuentes, likely the young 
man speaking on the video. In his speech he referenced the far right theme of 
the great replacement. While he did not speak those words, the substance of his 
talk reflected the idea (Groeger et al., 2021, video 340). He spoke with a crowd 
around and in front of him, many wearing AF hats and holding AF flags. The 
crowd facing him was filled with individuals filming the talk, at least one of which 
was posted to social media as it was happening. This video represents to best 
example of how cyberspace, physical space, and imagery combined into one 
dynamic.   
January 6, 2021 was only one event of many frequented by the far right 
just over the last year. The use of social media by the participants, both videos 
and textual posts, during the events of that day provide a window into how the far 
right uses imagery in both offline and online spaces, and how those two spaces 
come together. As evidenced by the results and discussion above, the cyber and 
physical space more than intertwined, they became on and the same on January 











CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Research Question 
 This study began two years ago as an exploration of phenomena 
observed in the local community. Why were there so many flags and symbols 
around town, on yards, houses, and even vehicles? Additionally, what did it 
mean when they appeared to be removed, only to go back up a few days later? It 
happened so much that it begged the question: was something being 
communicated? This led to research into the far right and development of the 
research question: how do far right online and offline spaces work in tandem and 
how does imagery facilitate this process? The hypothesis was that the spaces 
work together, and imagery helps spur participation and solidarity.  
 
Cyberspace, Physical Space, and Imagery 
A visual and audio analysis of 100 videos posted to Parler by participants 
of the attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, revealed that these two 
spaces not only were intertwined as previous research (Simi & Futrell, 2006) has 
shown, but the two spaces seemed to meld into one. The number of posts, just to 
Parler, not even including posts to other social media platforms, and the prolific 
use of imagery illustrated how the physical space being occupied by far right 
actors was concurrently existing in the virtual world. This analysis also 




demonstrated the rift in the far right between those who support law enforcement 
and those who are antigovernment. Another important finding was the presence 
of American First pushing their anti-globalism, anti-immigrant ideology.  
 
Study Limitations 
This study has several limitations. The content under analysis was 
sourced from a third party, ProPublica. While ProPublica is a trusted public 
resource, this study was confined to videos ProPublica previously sorted and 
found relevant to the events of January 6, 2021. This analysis would have also 
benefitted from first person ethnographic work at the Capitol on January 6. That 
was beyond the scope of this paper however, and it could have been a 
dangerous undertaking. Another improvement would have been to interview and 
send surveys to participants to hear their perspective of events. This study was 
also conducted using non sophisticated computer equipment and software that 
affected the level of analysis possible. Advanced computer programs that can do 
image recognition would have improved the analysis.  
 
Recommendations 
Given the research limitations discussed above, more research into this 
topic is essential. As extremism scholar Cynthia Miller-Idriss notes, “the visual 
nature of online spaces might suggest that their use will only accelerate in the 
years to come” (2020, p. 133). With the proliferation of websites that offer far 




right imagery for sale, the use of social media platforms, including the creation of 
new platforms to host actors and groups who have been kicked from mainstream 
sites, and the continued political polarization in the United States, it is likely that 
more incidents will occur that will provide the opportunity for further analysis. 
Hopefully, the violence and threat to American democracy witnessed on January 
6 will not be repeated. Recent research by J.M. Berger (2021), however, 
illustrates that violence from the far right might get worse. The threat from 
accelerationists is real and Berger finds a current theme among the far right is 
self-criticism: they are not doing enough, acceleration is key to create societal 
unrest and collapse (Berger, 2021). Also concerning is the participation of law 
enforcement and active duty members of the military, which seems to be a 
problem both in the United States and Germany. The U.S. military has taken a 
few steps to address the issue and Germany has been dealing with it for well 
over a year.  
January 6, 2021, like Charlottesville in 2017, has led to some disfunction 
within far right groups. The alt-right took a hit after Charlottesville’s Unite the 
Right Rally and the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys appear to be negatively 
affected as a result of the events at the Capitol. Members of both groups have 
been arrested and it looks increasingly like some individuals may turn and 
provide evidence against their cohorts. Two important lessons learned from the 
recent uptick in far right scholarship, however, are the far right may lay low, but 
they do not disappear, and they have mastered the use of the internet.   
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